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Submitted by Anonymous (not verified) on 18 December 2009

December 18, 2009
EDITORIAL
Iraq, the Kurds and the Americans

Four months ago, with little fanfare, the State Department sent a full-time senior diplomat, Alan Misenheimer, to live in Iraq's disputed oil-rich city Kirkuk. For the Obama administration, which had been hoping to back out of its day-to-day involvement in Iraq's fractious politics, it was a smart, if belated, call.

It was a recognition that the bitter discord between Iraq's Kurdish regional government and the Shiite-Arab- dominated central government — over land, oil and the power of the central government — is the most dangerous fault line in Iraq today. It was also an acknowledgment that if these conflicts are to be settled, or at least kept from igniting a new civil war, there must be deft and sustained American involvement.

Kurds and Arabs both lay claim to Kirkuk. This complicates, at times paralyzes, federal decision-making, including issues regarding the recently adopted election law. A referendum on Kirkuk's future, required by the Iraqi Constitution, has been postponed repeatedly because of Baghdad's fear that it would formalize Kurdish control.

In July, the Kurds came perilously close to holding a referendum on a regional constitution that would have unilaterally asserted control over Kirkuk. (Iraq's election commission conveniently decided there wasn't time to include the issue on the Kurdish ballots and Vice President Joe Biden, who has longstanding ties to the Kurds, urged the Kurds to postpone the referendum.)

There have been military face-offs — but luckily no actual conflict — between Kurdish and Arab troops. Sunni Arab extremists linked to Al Qaeda are eager to exploit these tensions.

The situation cannot be left to drift. Washington must make clear it will not accept a Kurdish secession or a Kurdish grab for Kirkuk, and that either would mean the end of American support. Baghdad must engage in good-faith negotiations over disputed territory and ensure that the Kurds receive an equitable share of oil revenue. But the Kurds must abandon any dream of controlling all of the region's oil revenue. The United States estimates Kurdistan has 10-15 percent of Iraq's reserves while the Kirkuk area holds as much as 25 percent.

•

Since the end of the gulf war, Washington has been the Kurds' chief patron, defender and, at times, enabler.

To protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein, NATO imposed a no-flight zone over northern Iraq and helped the Kurds build their autonomous region there — a virtual state within a state, commonly known as Kurdistan.

During the 2003 American invasion, the Bush administration enlisted the Kurdish militia, the peshmerga, as a proxy force and gave it free rein to expand beyond the 1991 regional border.

The Kurdish government, which officially controls three provinces, also claims cities and towns in three more just over the regional border. Those claims have become more insistent as President Obama's August 2010 deadline for withdrawing combat troops nears.

With just eight months until then, American officials — in Iraq and in Washington — have a lot of work to do to lower tensions between the Kurds and the rest of Iraq. Here are some of the most pressing issues:

2010 ELECTION It took considerable American arm-twisting to get the Iraqis to drop their disputes (including ones over who could vote in Kirkuk) and adopt a law for parliamentary elections, now scheduled for March. The election is a key test of Iraq's nascent democracy and a prerequisite for American troops to depart on schedule. American officials must press Iraqi politicians to avoid the kind of absolutist ethnically based campaign rhetoric that will make post-election deals harder.

After the 2005 elections it took the Iraqis months to agree on a government. Experts expect Kurdish leaders to demand Kirkuk-related concessions as part of a deal to choose a prime minister and deputies. Iraq's political system is stronger, but in this critical phase, American officials still must be ready to cajole, and, if necessary, push Iraqis to form a government and move ahead.

KIRKUK Decades of horrific abuse by Saddam Hussein — including the 1988 gassing of thousands of Kurds in Halabja — have driven Kurdish mistrust and resentment. Saddam forced thousands of Kurds and other minorities from the region and repopulated it with Arabs. That does not inevitably entitle the Kurds to more than a dozen disputed towns and villages in three border provinces: Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala.

The most fiercely contested is the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk and its surrounding province. (The Kurdish government is trying to bolster its claims by encouraging more Kurds to move there.) In April, the United Nations briefed Iraqi officials on a report outlining possible solutions, including a proposal that Kirkuk become an autonomous region run by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen.

Given the heated environment, the report has never been made public and American officials decided there was no chance for serious negotiations before the election. After that, they must quickly press all sides to establish a credible process for resolving the dispute.

If an early deal on Kirkuk is impossible, all three governments — Baghdad, the Kurds and Washington — should consider a period of outside administration, maybe United Nations-led. A referendum should only ratify a negotiated solution.

MOSUL The other hot spot is Nineveh Province and its capital, Mosul. Kurds are a strong minority, but after the Sunnis boycotted the 2005 provincial election, Kurds won control of the government. Even before that, the Kurdish regional government sought to create “facts on the ground,“ establishing security offices and checkpoints run by the peshmerga in many villages.

Fortunes in Nineveh shifted this year, when the Sunnis participated in provincial elections, and won the majority of council seats. They then stripped the Kurdish bloc, which came in second, of all positions and patronage. Since then tensions have continued to rise.

The United States and the United Nations must intensify mediation efforts. Arab-controlled regional governments must give Kurds and other minorities a legitimate share of power. Kurdish militia forces must be integrated into the federal army and regional police units. Last month, Human Rights Watch accused Kurdish authorities in the disputed provinces of using intimidation, threats, arrests and detention against minorities who resist Kurdish expansion plans.

OIL There is a lot of history behind the territorial disputes, but there is also a lot of money at stake. For two years, the central government has failed to adopt two crucial laws — one, setting rules for managing oil resources and the other, fixing a formula for sharing oil revenues between Baghdad and the regions.

Iraq continues to export oil, but without a legal framework for oil contracts, it cannot reliably attract the foreign investors needed to expand production. The regions, including Kurdistan, already receive a share of oil revenues. But mistrust on all sides is fierce.

The Kurds have challenged Baghdad's control by negotiating more than 30 oil contracts, and they pushed the dispute even further in October by halting oil exports from Kurdistan until Baghdad pays the international companies pumping from that region. The central government, which collects oil revenues, has refused to pay for the oil because it considers the contracts signed with Kurdistan to be illegal. The Bush administration never pressed Iraqis hard enough to settle the oil issue, and the Obama administration has not done any better. A negotiated solution, perhaps linked to Kirkuk, must be a priority to give Iraq's ethnic groups more certainty about their share of the resources and to mitigate furies that could still tear the country apart.

WEAPONS Before the United States can leave Iraq, it has to continue building up Iraq's Army. For that it will have to sell or give it better equipment including tanks and perhaps high-performance jets. Iraq needs to be able to defend itself in a dangerous region. But any buildup is inevitably going to feed Kurdish fears that they could become a target. Washington will have to pace its deliveries carefully and insist on guarantees that this equipment will never be turned against any Iraqis.

•

Iraq's political leaders need to find solutions to these issues as quickly as possible. The Obama administration must work assiduously to pave the way for agreements now when its diplomatic muscle is still reinforced by troops on the ground.

America's primary goal should be an orderly withdrawal that leaves Iraq with a chance at staying unified, sovereign and democratic. Washington has a strong claim on the Kurdish cooperation needed to achieve that.

نەناسراو (not verified)

Sat, 12/19/2009 - 00:07

ozet olarak aktarayim Irak, kurdler ve amerika aerika kerkuk sorununun cozmek icin ozel bir gorevli atamis (adi zikrediliyor) Kerkuk sorunu sii dominant araplar ile kurdler arasinda toprak-petrol ve ikdidar mucadelesinde en tehlikeli catlak olarak goruluyormus.bu sebeple bu konfliktin cozulmesi veya en azindan patlamasinin onune gecilmesi icin amerikanin marifetli bir bicimde ve uzun zamanli bir angajman icine girmesi gerekiyor (mush-oneri boyle-HeK). kerkuk uzerine araplar ve kurdler arasindakii nalsamazliklarin merkezi yonetiminin yappmasi gereken isleri, kararalari, secim yasasi vs gibi, karmasiklastirdigini VE (DIKKAT BURDAKI CUMLE ONEMLI HEK) anayasaya gore yapilmasi gereken kerkuk refarandumunun surekli ertelendigini, cunku bu referandumun sonucunun kerkuk uzerine kurdlerin controlunun formalize edeceginden korkuldugunu-belirtiyor. gecen temmuzda kurdler (BURDA KULANILN-SECILEN KELIMEYE DIKKAT EDIN!) [b]tehlikeli bir sekilde[/b] bolgesel anayasa uzerine referandum gerceklestirmeye cok yaklastilar, bu referandumun sonucu tektarafli kerkuk kontrolunu ilan etmelerine yolacabilecekti.(irak secim komisyonu allahtan (convenietly boyle cevirmeyi uygun buldum HeK) bu isin su an ele alinmamasi gerektigi kararini aldi ve Kurdler ile uzunsureli baglantisi olan Joe Biden de Kurdleri bu referandumu ertelemeleri icin UYARDI-dikkat urge diyor ikna etti filan demiyor. arkadaslar tercumeyi burda birakiyorum- yazinin devaminda da yukarida aktardigim bicimdeki berbat bir kelime secimleri ile ve kurd yoneticilerinin bu isten pek de anlamdigina dair ip uclari ile dolu. kurd meselesini devler sofrasinda nasil ele alindigini alinacagini merak edenler ingilze ogrenir veya bilen birilerinden tercumeyi rica eder. bu yaziyi yazdiktan sonra yetistirmem gerekn iki isim var benim vaktim yok. bir de bizim laf anlamaz hot headlara bir iki not dusecegim. bu hot headlarla ugrasmayi keyiften yapmiyorum. kurdlerin onemli ayak bagidir bu kultur-fikir beyani dusunce beyani hakkiniz ile cehaletinizi tekrarlama ussulsuzlugunu surekli bir birine karsitiriyorsunuz. israrli cehalet deklarasyonun berbat bir isarettir. welt in abuk subuk anketine gostereceginiz en saglikli tepki (oylama yapmak isteyenlerin bu istegine bir laf ettigim yok-ancak onceden yenileceginiz sacma sapan mevzi catismalari yerine galip gelme sansinizin buyuk olacagi meydan muharebesine hazirlanin be ahmaklar ! demeden duramayacagim) buyuk meydan muharebesine nasil hazirlanir? once zihinsel ordunun kanat generallerini mizrak liderlerini davasina ahlaki hukuki insani dokulari ile inanmis oncu elemanlari yetistirmek icin hocanizi dinlemek zorundasiniz yanlisini da dogrsunu da cunku burda ansiklepodik bilgiden cok size en munasip YONTEMI bulmanin YONTEMI uzerine konusmaya cabaliyoruz hocaniz kim? birisi benim kendi kendimi coktan atadim bu sevimsiz ise! bana hic bir faydasi yoktur durup duruken simsekleri nefretinizi uuzerime cekmekten baska size faydasi coktur-saymayla bitmez... benden alcak gonululuk beklemeyin onu yapanlarin ya kendilerine guveni yok ya da iyi artislikle kendilerini oyle gosterip kontrol kuruyorlar (cok cuzii bir azinlik olabilir gercekten alcak gonullu olanlar ki bunlarin da bu ekosistemde etkileri cok az olur-iclerine kapanik olurlar vs vs) benden akilli uslu durmami da beklemeyin biri eline cehalet degnegini alip basimiza kakmaya girisirse beline baldirina o degnegi yemeyi goze almasi gerek. basina degil her kurdun en kiymetli organi kelleleri bize lazim onlarin icinde nice kullanilmamis cehverler yatiyor petrolden de madenlerden de daha kiymetli ulusal degerlerimizdendirler onlari korumak onun tasiyan kadar bize de dusuyor vesselam HeK There have been military face-offs — but luckily no actual conflict — between Kurdish and Arab troops. Sunni Arab extremists linked to Al Qaeda are eager to exploit these tensions. The situation cannot be left to drift. Washington must make clear it will not accept a Kurdish secession or a Kurdish grab for Kirkuk, and that either would mean the end of American support. Baghdad must engage in good-faith negotiations over disputed territory and ensure that the Kurds receive an equitable share of oil revenue. But the Kurds must abandon any dream of controlling all of the region's oil revenue. The United States estimates Kurdistan has 10-15 percent of Iraq's reserves while the Kirkuk area holds as much as 25 percent. • Since the end of the gulf war, Washington has been the Kurds' chief patron, defender and, at times, enabler. To protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein, NATO imposed a no-flight zone over northern Iraq and helped the Kurds build their autonomous region there — a virtual state within a state, commonly known as Kurdistan. During the 2003 American invasion, the Bush administration enlisted the Kurdish militia, the peshmerga, as a proxy force and gave it free rein to expand beyond the 1991 regional border. The Kurdish government, which officially controls three provinces, also claims cities and towns in three more just over the regional border. Those claims have become more insistent as President Obama's August 2010 deadline for withdrawing combat troops nears. With just eight months until then, American officials — in Iraq and in Washington — have a lot of work to do to lower tensions between the Kurds and the rest of Iraq. Here are some of the most pressing issues: 2010 ELECTION It took considerable American arm-twisting to get the Iraqis to drop their disputes (including ones over who could vote in Kirkuk) and adopt a law for parliamentary elections, now scheduled for March. The election is a key test of Iraq's nascent democracy and a prerequisite for American troops to depart on schedule. American officials must press Iraqi politicians to avoid the kind of absolutist ethnically based campaign rhetoric that will make post-election deals harder. After the 2005 elections it took the Iraqis months to agree on a government. Experts expect Kurdish leaders to demand Kirkuk-related concessions as part of a deal to choose a prime minister and deputies. Iraq's political system is stronger, but in this critical phase, American officials still must be ready to cajole, and, if necessary, push Iraqis to form a government and move ahead. KIRKUK Decades of horrific abuse by Saddam Hussein — including the 1988 gassing of thousands of Kurds in Halabja — have driven Kurdish mistrust and resentment. Saddam forced thousands of Kurds and other minorities from the region and repopulated it with Arabs. That does not inevitably entitle the Kurds to more than a dozen disputed towns and villages in three border provinces: Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala. The most fiercely contested is the multi-ethnic city of Kirkuk and its surrounding province. (The Kurdish government is trying to bolster its claims by encouraging more Kurds to move there.) In April, the United Nations briefed Iraqi officials on a report outlining possible solutions, including a proposal that Kirkuk become an autonomous region run by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Given the heated environment, the report has never been made public and American officials decided there was no chance for serious negotiations before the election. After that, they must quickly press all sides to establish a credible process for resolving the dispute. If an early deal on Kirkuk is impossible, all three governments — Baghdad, the Kurds and Washington — should consider a period of outside administration, maybe United Nations-led. A referendum should only ratify a negotiated solution. MOSUL The other hot spot is Nineveh Province and its capital, Mosul. Kurds are a strong minority, but after the Sunnis boycotted the 2005 provincial election, Kurds won control of the government. Even before that, the Kurdish regional government sought to create “facts on the ground,“ establishing security offices and checkpoints run by the peshmerga in many villages. Fortunes in Nineveh shifted this year, when the Sunnis participated in provincial elections, and won the majority of council seats. They then stripped the Kurdish bloc, which came in second, of all positions and patronage. Since then tensions have continued to rise. The United States and the United Nations must intensify mediation efforts. Arab-controlled regional governments must give Kurds and other minorities a legitimate share of power. Kurdish militia forces must be integrated into the federal army and regional police units. Last month, Human Rights Watch accused Kurdish authorities in the disputed provinces of using intimidation, threats, arrests and detention against minorities who resist Kurdish expansion plans. OIL There is a lot of history behind the territorial disputes, but there is also a lot of money at stake. For two years, the central government has failed to adopt two crucial laws — one, setting rules for managing oil resources and the other, fixing a formula for sharing oil revenues between Baghdad and the regions. Iraq continues to export oil, but without a legal framework for oil contracts, it cannot reliably attract the foreign investors needed to expand production. The regions, including Kurdistan, already receive a share of oil revenues. But mistrust on all sides is fierce. The Kurds have challenged Baghdad's control by negotiating more than 30 oil contracts, and they pushed the dispute even further in October by halting oil exports from Kurdistan until Baghdad pays the international companies pumping from that region. The central government, which collects oil revenues, has refused to pay for the oil because it considers the contracts signed with Kurdistan to be illegal. The Bush administration never pressed Iraqis hard enough to settle the oil issue, and the Obama administration has not done any better. A negotiated solution, perhaps linked to Kirkuk, must be a priority to give Iraq's ethnic groups more certainty about their share of the resources and to mitigate furies that could still tear the country apart. WEAPONS Before the United States can leave Iraq, it has to continue building up Iraq's Army. For that it will have to sell or give it better equipment including tanks and perhaps high-performance jets. Iraq needs to be able to defend itself in a dangerous region. But any buildup is inevitably going to feed Kurdish fears that they could become a target. Washington will have to pace its deliveries carefully and insist on guarantees that this equipment will never be turned against any Iraqis. • Iraq's political leaders need to find solutions to these issues as quickly as possible. The Obama administration must work assiduously to pave the way for agreements now when its diplomatic muscle is still reinforced by troops on the ground. America's primary goal should be an orderly withdrawal that leaves Iraq with a chance at staying unified, sovereign and democratic. Washington has a strong claim on the Kurdish cooperation needed to achieve that.

Ben iyi bir cevirmen degilim aslina sadik kalmaya calistim. Turkceyi unutmaya basladigimi da fark ettim. Sofi December 18, 2009 EDITORIAL Iraq, the Kurds and the Americans . 4 ay once Amerikan yonetimi full time tecrubeli diplomat Alan Misenheimer'i kucuk bir torenle yasamasi icin Irak'in tartisilan petrol zengini sehri Kirkuk'e gonderdi. Irak'in huysuz politikasina her gun mudahele etmekten kurtulmayi umut eden Obama yonetimi icin akilli ama gecikmis bir karardi. Bu hareket ayni zamanda Irak'in Kurd Bolgesel Yonetimi ve Shii-Arap-kontrolundeki (Irak) merkez devleti- merkezi devletin toprak,petrol ve gucu- hakkinda ki gecimsizligin (ABD tarafindan) taninmasiydi.Kirkuk, Irak'in en tehlikeli fay (kirilma) hattidir. Kirkuk uzerine celiskilere bir cozum bulunamazsa en azinda bu celiskilerin bir ic savasa sebep olmasi engellenmelidir. Kurdler de Araplarda Kirkuk'e sahip olmayi istiyor. Bu durum federal kararlari vermeyi ve yeni uygulanan secim yasasinin uygulanmasini guclestirmekte hatta bazen felc etmektedir. Irak anayasasina gore Kirkuk'un gelecegi icin yapilmasi gereken referendum,Baghdad hukumetinin Kirkuk'te Kurd kontrolunu yasallastiracagi korkusu yuzunden defalarca iptal edilmisti. Kurdler Temmuz ayinda Kurdistan Bolgesel Anayasasinin icerigine Kirkuk'un tektarafli kontrolu icin bir referendum hazirlamaya tehlikeli bir sekilde yaklasmislardi.Irak Secim Komisyonu islerine geldigi bir sekilde karar alip bu konunun Kurd secim kartlarina konulmasi icin zaman darligini bahane etmislerdi. Uzun bir suredir Kurdlerle yakin iliskisi olan Baskan yardimcisi Joe Biden referandumu ertemeleri Kurd yonetimini icin uyarmisti.) Kurd ve Arap askeri birlikleri arasinda yuzlesmeler –sansina carpismasiz- olmustu. Al Qaide baglantili Sunni – Arap asiri uclari bu gerilimi arttirmak icin cok ugrasiyorlar. Bu durum suruncemede birakilamaz. Washington artik Kurdlerin Kirkuk'e sahip olmalarini ve iraktan ayrilmalarini-Amarika Kurdlerden aldigi destegi kaybetse bile kabul edemez. Baghdad iyi niyetle tartisilan bolge icin gorusmalara baslamali ve Kurdlerle esit miktarda petrol gelirlerini paylasmali. Ama Kurdlerde bolgenin tum petrol gelirlerini elde etmek ruyasindan vazgecmeliler.Amerikanin tahminine gore Kurdistanin %10-15 petrol rezervine karsilik Kirkuk'un petrol rezervi ise Tum Irak'a nazaran en fazla %25 tir. Korfez savasindan bu yana Amerika Kurdlere patronluk, Savunuculuk ve bazen de imkan saglayicisi olmustu. Kurdleri Saddam dan korumak icin Nato tarafindan Kuzey Irakta ucaklarin ucusunu yasaklamis ve Kurdlerin otonomi bolgesi kurmalarina yardimci olmustu. 2003 amerikan istilasi sirasinda Bush yonetimi Pesmergeye 1991 bolgesel sinirlarini bile asarak genislemelerine izin vermisti. Yasal olarak 3 eyaleti control eden Kurd hukumeti ayni zamanda bolgesel sinirlarinin disindaki 3 ayri sehir ve kasaba uzerine hak idda etmektedir. Baskan Obamanin Agustos 2010 tarihindeki birliklerin cekilecegi sebebiyle bu hak iddalari daha israrli bir hal almaktadir. [b]Amerikan askerlerinin cekilmesine 8 ay zaman kala Amerikan yetkilileri ve Irak hukumeti bolgedeki tansiyonu dusurmeleri icin cozmeleri gereken konular[/b]: [b]2010 SECIMLERI[/b]: Meclis secimleri icin yasal duzenlemeler kabullenmesi ve Iraklilarin Kirkuk uzerine kimlerin oy kullanabilecegi uzerine anlasmalari ve aralarindaki anlasmazliklari cozmeleri gereklidir.. Mart ayi icin planlanan Secimler Irak'in gelismeye baslayan demokrasisinin olusmasina ve Amerikan askerlerinin Iraktan ayrilmalarina onkosullu bir deneme olacaktir.Amerikan yetkilileri Irakli politikacilarindan mulakiyetci, etnik agirlikli ve secimi zorlastiracak nutuklara maydan vermemelerini istemelidir 2005 secimlerinden sonra Iraklilarin hukumet kurmak icin anlasmalari aylar tutmustu.Uzmanlar Kurd liderlerinin Kirkuk icin alinacak kararlar acisindan uygun bir basbakan ve yardimcilarinin secilmesini istemelerini beklemektedir. Irak'in politik sistemi simdi daha gucludur fakat kritik bir safhadadir. Amerikan yetkilileri Irak yetkililerilini tatli sozlerle ikna etmeye hazir olmali ve gerekirse iraklilari hizli bir sekilde hukumet kurmalari icin zorlamalidir. [b]KIRKUK[/b]: yillarca Saddam Huseyinin vahseti- Halabja nin 1988 deki binlarce kurdun kimyasal gazla oldurulmesi- Kurdleri guvensizlik ve kizginliga itmistir. Saddam binlerce Kurdu ve diger azinliklari bolgeden cikartarak yerine araplari yerlestirmisti.Ancak bu durum Kurdlere bir duzineden fazla Kirkuk Ninevah ve Diyala eyaletlerineki kasaba ve sehirler uzerine hak idda etmelerine sebep olmamalidir.. En atesli tartismalar ise metropolitan sehir olan Kirkuk ve cevresindeki eyaletler uzerine (Kurd Hukumeti hakkini guclendirmek icin kurdleri Kirkuke yerlesmeye cesaret vermektedir.) Nisan ayinda Birlesmis milletler Kirkukun otonomi bolgesi olmasi ve Kurdler Araplar ve turkmenler tarafindan idare edilmesi icin Irak yetkilileri ile bir toplanti duzenlemislerdi Ortami daha fazla isitmamak icin hazirlanan rapor aciklanmadi ve Amerikan yetkilileri secimlerden once ciddi gorusmelerin yapilmasi icin sans verilmesine karar verdi.Eger Kirkuk icin erken bir cozum mumkun degilse her 3 hukumet Baghdad Kurdler ve Washington yonetim disi bir cozum aramali, gerekirse Birlesmis milletlerin onculugunde sadece gorusmelerin bir referendum ile cozumlenmesini onaylamalidir. [b]MUSUL[/b] : Nineveh eyaletinin baskenti ve bir baska sicak sehir, Musul, Kurdlerin guclu bir cogunluk oldugu sehir. Sunnilerin 2005 eyalet secimlerinin boykotundan sonra Kurdler hukumet kontrolunu ele gecirdiler, Daha onceleri Kurd Bolgesel hukumetinin Pesmerge gucleri cevre koylerde guvenligi ve control noktalarini ele gecirmislerdi. Bu sene Ninevah da kader, sunnilerin eyelet secimlerine katilmasiyla ve konseyde cogunlugu kazanmalariyla degisti, Kurdlerin gucu etkisizlesti –ki secimlerde ikinci gelmislerdi. simdi ise tansiyon yeniden yukselmeye basladi. Amerika ve Birlesmis milletler arabulucu cabalarini yogunlastirmalilar. Arap kontrolundeki Bolgesel hukumetler Kurdlere ve diger azinliklarla yasal gucu esit olarak paylasmali. Kurd Askeri gucleri Irak ordusu icinde eritilmeli ve bolgesel polis birlikleri haline donusturulmelidir. Gecen ay Insan Haklari gozlemcileri(Human Rights Watch) Kurd yetkililerinin genisleme planlarina karsi cikanlari tehdid etmek tutklamak ve hapis etmekle suclamisti [b]PETROL[/b] Arkasinda cok tarih olan ve en fazla paranin oldugu bir tartisma. Iki yildir Merkez hukumeti iki elzem yasayi hazirlayamadi. Biri Petrolun yonetimi icin kurallari koymak ve ikincisi ise petrol gelirlerinin Baghdad ve diger bolgeler arasinda paylasimi icin bir formulun uygulanmasi. Irak petrol ihracatina herhangi bir yasal cerceve olmadan petrol kontratlarina devam etmektedir.Bu durum uretimin arttirilmasi icin yabanci sermayeye cazip gelmemektedir.Kurdistan dahil diger bolgeler her nekadar petrol gelirlerinden pay almakta iseler de karsilikli guvensizlik hat safhadadir. Kurdler Baghdad kontrolune yaptiklari 30 a yakin petrol baglantili gorusmeleri ile meydan okumustu.Hatta daha da ileriye giderek Ekim ayinda Kurdistandan petrol ihracatini Baghdad yonetiminin uluslararasi sirketlere pompaladigi petrol ucretlerini odeyinceye kadar durdurmustu.Petrol gelirlerini toplayan Merkez Hukumeti ise Kurdlerin imzaladigi petrol anlasmalarinin yasal olmadigi gerekcesi ile odemeyi yapmayi red etmisti. Ote yandan Bush Hukumeti Iraklilari petrol konusunun cozumunde gereken baskiyi uygulamamisti. Obama Hukumeti de konu uzerinde daha iyisini yapmadi.Gorusmeler sonunda Kirkuk sorununa baglantili zenginliklerin paylasiminda oncelik Irak'in etnik gruplarina verilmelidir aksi takdirde dolasan ofke irak'i parcalayacaktir. [b]SILAHLAR[/b] Amerika Iraktan ayrilmadan once Irak ordusunu insaa etmeye devam etmeli.Bu yuzden daha iyi araclar satmali veya vermelidir buna tanklar ve yuksek performansli savas ucaklari da dahil edilmelidir. Irak tehlikeli bir bolgede kendini savunabilmelidir.Ancak verilecek bu silahlar Kurdleri hedef almamasi icin Washington tarafindan garanti varilmelidir. Irak'in politik liderleri bu konulara acil olarak cozum bulmalidir. Obama yonetiminin diplamatik gucu iraktaki askerlerle destekleniyorken anlasmalarin uygulanmasi icin surekli bir calisma icinde olmalidirlar. Amerikanin birinci hedefi duzenli bir cekilmeden sonra Irak'in birlesik, bagimsiz ve demokratik kalmasini garantilemektir.Halen Washington Kurdlerin guclu bir isbirligine sahipken bunu basarabilir.

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